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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This chapter examines reasons for the rise in the share of taxes paid by
upper-income individuals following the passage of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act (ERTA) in 1981. It extends this analysis to estimate the potential
revenue consequences of behavioral responses by taxpayers to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). Our major findings are as follows:
I. Wage, salary, and professional income constitute an increasingly large
share of the income of upper-income taxpayers.
Lower tax rates on earnings and capital gains explain most of the
redistribution of tax shares following ERTA.
Upper-income individuals received a declining share of dividend and
interest income in spite of macroeconomic reasons to expect the oppo-
site.
Higher tax revenues due to greater wage, salary, and professional
income may increase expected tax revenues by as much as $15 billion
annually under TRA86.
Potential declines in capital gains realizations may lower expected tax
revenues by as much as $30 billion annually under TRA86, relative to a
nonbehavioral estimation.132Lindsey
6. The combined effect of all responses to TRA86 implies a decline in the
share of taxes paid by upper-income taxpayers rather than an increased
share expected under nonbehavioral assumptions.
1. INTRODUCTION
The existence of a substantial taxpayer response to the sharp reduction in
the top tax rates under the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) is now
generally accepted. In an earlier paper, Lindsey (1987a) estimated that this
response was sufficient to generate as much tax revenuewith a 50 percent
top tax rate as would have been gathered if the earlier 70 percent ratehad
been maintained. In an investigation using a slightly different methodol-
ogy, the Congressional Budget Office (1987, p.501) concluded that:
The data show considerable evidence of a very significant revenue response among
taxpayers at the very highest income levels. This finding of a strong revenue re-
sponse in the top income group holds true for bothprojection methods and all
target years.
On the other hand, there is little evidence of a substantial positive
behavioral response to ERTA by lower- and middle-income taxpayers. In
fact, the Lindsey and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) studies both
noted that the income of lower-income groups was below predicted levels,
just as the income of upper-income groups was above predicted levels. A
number of explanations of this have been advanced. First, the data show
that overall tax rates for many of these groups, including state income and
Social Security taxes, showed little decline or actually increased over the
period studied.' Second, the income tax changes may have had little or no
effect on economic growth. The simulation procedures used by Lindsey
and CBO took the level of income as constant, implicitly assuming that
taxes had no effect on growth. When this is coupled with theupper-income
response, a redistribution of income away fromlower-income taxpayers
results. Third, these groups may not be tax sensitive. This may be due to
limited knowledge of tax avoidance possibifities or difficulty in controlling
the form of one's compensation and in changing the income from one's
portfolio.
For whatever reason, the small response by lower- and moderate-income
taxpayers, coupled with the large response by upper-income taxpayers,
greatly raised the share of taxes paid by upper-income taxpayers. For
ILindsey (1987a) found that the majority of taxpayers had increased marginal tax rates over
the period due to increases in Social Security taxes and the effect of bracket creep onfederal
tax rates.ERTA Raise Taxes of the Upper Income133
example, taxpayers earning over $200,000 paidmore than 15 percent of
total taxes in 1985, but this share would have beenonly 10 percent in the
absence of a behavioral response by taxpayers.
Section 1 considers the magnitude of therevenue response by upper-
income taxpayers in the period 1981-1985as well as the changing nature of
these high-income individuals. Often overlookedin the discussion of the
behavior of upper-income taxpayers is the factthat the composition of
income of these taxpayers has changed in recentyears. In particular, the
importance of salary and professional income hasgrown, and the impor-
tance of investment income has fallen.
Section 2 considers possible reasons why the behavioralresponse of
upper-income taxpayers, as measured by the CBO andLindsey studies,
was substantially greater than that for lower-income taxpayers. The exist-
ence of taxpayer responsiveness to tax rates is well documented in such
areas as labor supply, capital gains realizations, and theuse of fringe
benefits as compensation. We takea detailed look at some of the separate
components of income in order to look for explanations of theresponse of
taxpayers to ERTA.
The final section extrapolates the likely impact ofTRA86 from these
conclusions. That Act resulted in a reduction of thetop marginal tax rate
from 50 to 33 percent, withan even lower 28 percent rate for very-high-
income taxpayers. If the taxpayer response to the latesttax reform parallels
that following the 1981 Act, the tax share paid byupper-income individuals
will rise further. However, the changes in the1986 Act were more complex
than in 1981. Some rates increased while othersdecreased. The final section
examines the likely revenue consequences of theseconflicting rate
changes.
2. CHANGES IN REVENUE AND TYPEOF INCOME AT
THE TOP
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 mandateda 23 percent phased
reduction in tax rates between 1981 and 1984. Thetop tax rate was reduced
from 70 to 50 percent beginning in 1982. Indexingof tax brackets was then
begun in 1985. In addition, individualretirement accounts were extended
to all taxpayers, and a partial exclusion of earned income forthe lower-
earning spouse of two-earner coupleswas enacted. In the absence of
taxpayer response to lower tax rates, these provisions wouldhave cost the
Treasury some $110 billion annually by the timethey were fully phased in
in 1985.
In analyzing the effects of taxpayer behavioron tax revenue, we must
contrast the actual cost of the tax rate changes and thecost estimated under134Lindsey
an alternative set of economicassumptions. This section begins with a brief
description of the methodology involved. It thenfocuses on the changing
composition of income for top-bracket taxpayers.
2.1 Estimating the Actual Cost of TaxRate Changes
The actual revenue cost of these provisions cannotbe known for certain; it is
hypothetical. The revenue cost depends on how taxpayerswould have
behaved had ERTA not been enacted, and on themacroeconomic conditions
that would have prevailed had the higher amountof revenue, associated with
higher marginal tax rates, been collected by thegovernment. To estimate the
actual revenue cost, we must construct a predictedlevel and distribution of
income, known as a baseline. This baseline is anestimate of what the level and
distribution of income would have been had the tax cut notbeen passed. The
baseline is constructed by pooling information on the incomedistribution in a
year prior to the tax cut with changesin the level and composition of income
between that earlier year and the year being studied.
The emphasis of this chapter, and of the Lindseyand CBO papers, is on
the microeconomic behavior of individual taxpayers,not the effect of tax
cuts on macroeconomic conditions. Themacroeconomic conditions that actu-
ally prevailed during the period were taken as given.The revenue estimates
that result from this approach do not, therefore,take account of the feedback
effect of lower tax rates on macroeconomic activity.Only the redistribution of
the shares of that activity among different income groupsis measured.
To control for as many macroeconomicfactors as possible in constructing
the baseline, we set the level of income equal to theactual level of income for
each component of personal income. That is, thebaseline level of components
of income such as wages, interest, dividends, andbusiness income were each
targeted to match the actual level of that componentof income. Therefore,
factors such as the rapid rise in interest income and interestrates were factored
into the creation of the baseline. The changesin the overall distribution of
income brought about by these macroeconomicfactors are consequently also
incorporated into the baseline. The residual difference betweenthe actual and
baseline distributions not caused by tax factors isminimized.
The resulting estimates of the effect of the tax rate cuts on tax revenue are
shown in Figure 1. Tax revenue is shown underthree different scenarios. The
first scenario is that the old tax law is continued. Inthis scenario, the baseline
level and distribution of income are applied to the old taxlaw and the resulting
amount of tax computed. The second scenariopredicts the level of taxes given
the baseline income distribution under the new tax law.A comparison of these
two lines shows the revenue cost of the taxlaw change assuming no change
in taxpayer behavior. This comparison showsthat the cost of the tax bifi rises
from about $5 billion in 1981 to more than $110 billion in1985.ERTA Raise Taxes of the Upper Income135
1981 1982 1983
All Taxpayers
FIGURE 1. Actual and Predicted Tax Revenue
The third scenario presents the actual taxrevenue collected in each year
under ERTA. In Figure 1, this line runs between the old law andnew law
predictions. The distance between the actualrevenue line and the old law
line shows the actual revenue loss due to the tax law change. On theother
hand, the distance between the actual revenue line and thenew law line
shows the additional amount of revenue loss that would have occurredhad
there been no behavioral response by taxpayers.
Figure 1 clearly indicates that the behavioralresponse made up only a
small portion of the total revenue loss due to the tax bifi. For example,in
1982 the added revenue amounted to about $11 biffion,or only one-quarter
of the total prospective loss from the bifi. In 1983 the behavioralresponse
was only a bit more than $8 billion, out of a total possible revenue loss of
$75 billion. In 1984 the response amounted to about $15 billionout of a
possible loss of $100 billion, whereas in 1985 about $13 billionwas
recaptured out of a possible loss of $110 billion. These numberssuggest
that only about 10 to 15 percent of the revenue loss from the ERTAtax cuts
was recouped as a result of the behavioral response of taxpayers. The claim
by some supply side economists that across-the-boardrate reductions
would produce added revenue is discredited by this data.
On the other hand, Figure 2 shows a different conclusion regardingthe
revenue collected from upper-income taxpayersthose earning over
$200,000.2 These data indicate that upper-income taxpayers paidmore
2In each year, baseline taxpayers were ranked by income. The figurepresents the taxes paid
by the same number of taxpayers in the baseline as had incomesover $200,000 in each year.






FIGURE 2. Actual and Predicted Tax Revenue
taxes under the new law than they would havepaid under the old tax law.
The difference between the old-law and predictednew-law figures shows
that in the absence of a behavioral response, upper-incometaxpayers
would have received a substantial tax cut under ERTA.This scheduled tax
reduction was about $3.5 bfflion in 1982, $5.5 biffion in 1983,$7 billion in
1984, and over $8 billion in 1985.
The actual taxes paid under the new law exceeded the amountpredicted
by the baseline by substantial amounts. This differenceis the amount of
revenue attributable to taxpayer response.Upper-bracket taxpayers paid
$4.2 billion more than predicted in 1982, $8 billion more in 1983,$13 billion
more in 1984, and nearly $18 billion morein 1985. In each year, this
taxpayer response exceeded the scheduled amountof the tax cut. As a
result, the Treasury netted $0.6 bfflion more in 1982from top-bracket
taxpayers under the new law than the baselinepredicted they would have
under the old law. The comparable amounts of extra revenue are$2.7
billion for 1983, $6.3 billion for 1984, and $9.6 billion for 1985.
These data suggest that the across-the-board tax rate reductionsof ERTA
not only did not produce extra revenue but resultedin a significant de-
cline in revenue. However, reductions in the top ratedid increase total
tax receipts from that income class. Thecombined effects of these two
facts produced a sharp rise in the tax share paidby upper-income
individuals.
1984 1985
the number of taxpayers earning over $200,000 rose over the period, asdid their incomes.
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FIGURE 3. Actual as a Percent of Predicted Income, High-Income
Taxpayers (Over $200,000)
2.2 Changes in the Composition of Top Incomes
This revenue increase from upper-income individualswas the result of an
increase in the taxable income they reported. Differentcomponents of
income for upper-income taxpayers increasedmore than others in response
to the tax rate changes. Figure 3 presents the ratios of the actual level of
income to the level predicted by the baseline for four types ofincome:
portfolio (dividends plus interest), wage and salary, capital gains,and
"other." The last category is primarily composed of income from busi-
nesses, including partnerships, proprietorships, small business corpora-
tions, rents, and royalties, and is calculated by subtracting portfolioincome,
wages and salaries, and capital gains from adjusted gross income (AGI).
The figure indicates that greater reporting of income by upper-income
taxpayers was due to greater reporting of business income, capital gains
income, and wage income. The level of portfolio income reported by
upper-income taxpayers was actually lower than predicted by the baseline.
The rising share of wage and business income and capital gains income
in the total income3 of upper-income taxpayers is also indicated inan
historical trend. It is inaccurate to think of top-bracket individualsas
deriving the bulk of their income from passivesources such as interest and
dividends. In 1983, only 21 percent of the income of the top 0.1percent of
the income distribution came from interest, dividends, and othernon-
' For this analysis, total income represents AGI plus the excludedportion of capital gains, IRA
contributions, Keoghs, and the two-earner deduction. It is comparableto the expanded
income concept used by CBO.
I
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capital-gains investment income. In contrast, 25 percentof the income of
these top taxpayers came from earned sources.
This relatively high earnings share, and relatively lowshare of invest-
ment income, is a recent phenomenon. For sakeof comparison, contrast
1983, the first year of economic expansion after thedeep recession of
1981-1982, with 1975, the first year of expansion followingthe oil-shock
recession of 1973-1974. After controlling for macroeconomicchanges be-
tween 1975 and 1983, the top 0.1 percentof income recipients in 1975
received only 20.5 percent of their income from earned sources, com-
pared with 24.7 percent in 1983. The 1975 share of othercapital income
was 23.5 percent, compared with21.3 percent in 1983. Capital gains fell
from 56 percent of their income in 1975 to 54 percent in1983. In short, the
earned share of compensation for these very-high-income taxpayers rose
by more than 4 percentage points, or more than 20 percent,between 1975
and 1983.
This historic trend dates back at least to 1960.Controffing for macroeco-
nomic changes between 1960 and 1983, the top 0.1 percentof 1960 income
recipients would have gotten only 14.7 percent of theirincome from earned
sources. Of the rest, 34.1 percent camefrom capital gains, and 51.2 percent
from other sources of capital income. Between 1960and 1983, the 30-
percentage-point decline in the share of ordinary capital incomein total
income for these very-high-income taxpayers occurred.Roughly one-third
of this represented a shift into wage income, and theremaining two-thirds
comprised a shift into capital gains income. Figure 4 presents thesechanges
in the income shares of the top 0.1 percent of taxpayers.
This change is even more dramatic when the top 2 percentof taxpayers
are considered. Again controffingfor macroeconomic changes, the earn-
ings share in total income rose from 30.7 percent in 1960 to48.3 percent in
1975 and to 55.1 percept in 1983. In contrast, the earningsfrom non-capital-
gains investment income fell from 54.6 percentof income in 1960 to 27.8
percent in 1975 and to 18.6 percent in 1983. Thecapital gains share rose
from 14.7 percent in 1960 to 23.9 percent in 1975 and to 26.3 percentin 1983.
For the top 2 percent, the 36-point decline in ordinarycapital income went
about two-thirds into wages and one-third into capitalgains. This is
represented graphically by Figure 5.
3. DIFFERENT BEHAVIOR OFVARIOUS INCOME
COMPONENTS
The previous section considered the changes in thereporting of income by
upper-income taxpayer groups. Not only did the shareof income and taxesOrd. Invst Income (51.20%)
1960
Ord. Invst. Income (2:
1975
1983
Capital Gains Income (56.00%)
Capital Gains Income (54.00%)
FIGURE 4. Sources of Income (adjusted for macroeconomic conditions of
very-high-income taxpayersthe top 0.1%)
paid by top-bracket taxpayers rise when the top tax rate was reduced,
the composition of income of these upper-income taxpayers also changed.
By disaggregating the data into the individual components of income
(wages and salaries, capital gains, business income, and interest and
dividends), we can gather further information about the cause of these
changes.
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FIGURE 5. Sources of Income (adjusted for macroeconomic conditions of
high-income taxpayersthe top 2%)
3.1 The Investigation of Behavioral Responses
Note that the preceding analysis, irdicating a rise in taxes paid by
upper-income taxpayers, ignores what is usually termed "supply side"
effects. That is, the effect of tax rate changes on the amount of labor and
capital supplied to the economy is omitted from the analysis. This is
necessary because the effect of such macroeconomicfactors as monetary
policy cannot be separated from the supply side effect of tax changes in
Earned Income (30.70%)
Earned Income (48.30%)
Capital Gains Income (14.70%)
Capital Gains Income (23,90%)








FIGURE 6. Perfectly equal distribution
determining the level of nominal income. Therefore, in determining the
baseline level of income, we take the actual levels of eachcomponent of
income as given, which is equivalent to assuming that therewas no change
in income due to supply side effects.
However, the existence of possible supply side effectscan be discerned
indirectly. Most of the nontax factors, such as monetary policy, that
determine the level of a particular component of income have littleor no
effect on the distribution of that component of income. But thevarious tax
rate changes are likely to have dramatic distributionalconsequences. These
distributional consequences resulted from the differential reduction intax
rates applied to different recipients of each type of income. If the change in
the actual distribution of income is systematically related to the changein
the distribution of income that can be predicted using results fromthe
literature, then a case exists that a tax-induced change in behavior occurred.
The test of the data for a behavioralresponse involves a two-step
process. Figure 6 ifiustrates the first step in the test for a tax-induced
behavioral change. It shows the calculation of the income distribution
measure known as the Gini coefficient. The horizontal axis represents the
cumulative percent of the population, and the vertical axis represents the
cumulative percent of income. A line of perfect equality would be perfectly











equal distributions of income wifi be indicated by linesincreasingly bowed
in from this line of perfect equality. The Girdcoefficient measures the
inequality of the income distribution by comparing theratio of the area
between the actual distribution and the perfectequality line to the area of
the triangle formed by the line of perfect equalityand the two axes.
For most components of income, the distributionof income after the tax
cut was less equal than the distribution of incomebefore the tax cut. Figure
6 illustrates this with "pre-ERTA" and "post-ERTA"distributional lines.
For this study the old-law line reflects thedistribution of income in 1979,
whereas the ERTA line reflects the distribution of incomein 1983. The
ERTA line is ifiustrated as more bowed in than the old-lawline because of
the less equal distribution of income in the latter year.
To test for the effectiveness of tax explanations for theobserved changes
in income, we created a simulated distributionof income based on the
change in prevailing tax rates and an assumption aboutthe amount of
response expected from taxpayersdrawn from existing research. In each
case we start with the post-ERTA cutdistribution of income and use tax rate
changes to simulate what the distribution would havebeen had the
pre-ERTA rates prevailed.
This simulated response can fall in any of three regions inFigure 6,
indicated by Si, S2, and S3. If the simulation line is in regionSi, then the
simulation assumptions overpredict the actual behavioral response.That is,
the actual distributional change turned out to be less thanthe distributional
change predicted by the set of assumptions used. If thesimulation line is in
region S2, then the simulation assumptionsunderpredict the actual behav-
ioral response. This can be because the chosen parameteris too small, or
because some other effect correlated with income is atwork. Finally, if the
simulation line is in region S3, then the simulation assumptionswrongly
predict the actual response. That is, the actual change went inthe direction
opposite to that predicted by the model.
The region in which the simulation line lays providesthe qualitative
answer regarding the existence of a supplyside response. A quantitative
answer regarding the predictive powerof the simulated response can be
tested by comparing the distribution of income in the taxsimulation with
the pre-ERTA and post-ERTA distributions. To determinethe ability of the
simulated response to explain the change in the distribution, wedivided
the continuous distribution shown in Figure 5 into twelvediscrete seg-
ments. These segments are the bottom 25 percent,the 25th-5Oth percent-
iles,the 50th-7Oth percentiles, the 7Oth-80th, 8Oth-85th,85th-90th,
90th-95th, 95th-98th, 98th-99th, 99th-99.5th, 99.5th-99.9th,and the top
0.1 percent of income recipients.
The share of income received by each group is calculatedfor theERTA Raise Taxes of the Upper Income143
pre-ERTA, post-ERTA, and simulated distributions. As noted above, the
simulated distribution fell in area S2 of Figure 6. Thismeans that the
simulated distribution explained part of the change from the pre-ERTA
distribution to the post-ERTA distribution. To calculate how much of the
change was explained, we compared the variance between the pre-ERTA
and post-ERTA distributions with the variance between the predicted and
post-ERTA distributions. Dividing the latter variance by the formerpro-
vides the share of the variance between the pre-ERTA and post-ERTA
distributions explained by the simulated response. Under thismeasure, the
closer the simulated response is to the post-ERTA distribution from which
it originated, the less is the share of the variance that is explained. The
closer the simulated response is to the pre-ERTA distribution, the greateris
the share of the variance that is explained. This approachmeasures both
the overall abifity of the simulation parameters to explain distributional
changes and the ability of that approach to explain the changes observed in
particular income groups.
3.2 Evidence of Omitted Supply Side and Pecuniary Changes
3.2.1 Wage and Salary Income.The first test for supply side effects is
performed in the area of wage and salary income. The economic literature
suggests that the labor supply response of prime-age males is quite low,
whereas the response for females tends to be quite high. The differential
response is important because the ERTA provided for an extra marginal tax
rate reduction for the lower-earning spouse in a two-earner family. This
extra marginal rate reduction (equal to 10 percent of the regular rate)was
directly targeted to the worker in the family likely to be most responsiveto
a tax rate change. Although the tax model we used does not specify the sex
of the worker, it does provide separate data on the earnings of the higher-
and lower-earning spouses.
For simulation purposes, the labor supply elasticity of the higher-earning
spouse with respect to the marginal share of compensation retained after
tax was set equal to 0.1. The elasticity for the lower-earning spousewas
assumed to be 1.0. The pre-ERTA and post-ERTA tax rates for eachearner
were computed. The post-ERTA earnings were reduced for each worker in
accordance with the assumed elasticity and the change in the tax rate. The
result was a simulated level and distribution of wage and salary income for
each taxpayer unit. The distribution of this simulated resultwas then
plotted and compared with the pre-ERTA distribution.
The elasticities chosen for the simulation are on the high side of therange
of estimates of male and female labor supply elasticities in the literature. In
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FIGURE 7. Labor supply response of wages (percent of variance
explained)
Figure 6, implying that the assumed elasticities underpredictedthe change
in the distribution of wage and salary income.
Figure 7 ifiustrates the ability of the simulated response to explain the
difference between the pre-ERTA and post-ERTA earned income shares for
different income classes. The figure shows that the simulated response
explained about half of the change in the income distribution for the bottom
99 percent of the taxpayer population. It wasparticularly effective at
explaining the income change for the upper middle classthose betweenthe
85th and 98th percentiles. These taxpayer groups had wage income between
$40,000 and $80,000 in 1983. On the other hand, the simulated labor supply
response was unable to explain the enormous increasein the wage and salary
income reported by the upper 1 percent of wage and salary recipients.
This provides an indication that at least some supply side change was at
work. The change in wages and salaries in this simulation amounts to $38
billion out of total wages and salaries of $1645 bfflion, or a bit less than 2.5
percent. Of this change, $23 billion, or 61 percent of thechange, was due
to the behavioral response of secondary earners4,whereas the response of
Corroborating evidence of an increase in female labor supply includes a dramatic decline of
the difference between female and male unemployment rates beginning in 1982and a rise in
the ratio of female-to-male earnings at the same time. In 1982, for the first time since 1949,the
adult female unemployment rate was below the adult male unemployment rate. Inthe five-
year period during which this provision was in place, theadult female unemployment rate
averaged 0.2 percent lower than the adult male unemployment rate. By contrast, in thefive-
year period immediately preceding 1982, the female unemployment rateexceeded the male
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primary earners and single earners amounted to only $13 billion. This
response is relatively small at the top of the income distribution because the
importance of secondary earners incomes in total wages and salaries in that
income range is quite small.
If this extra labor supply is attributable to the supply side effects of tax
rate reductions, then ceteris paribus an additional $8 billion annually was
added to federal income tax collections. This occurs because the simula-
tions described in section 1 took the economic conditions of the period as
given. Had this extra labor supply not been forthcoming, the real level of
wage income and the resulting level of tax revenue would have been lower.
However, this supply side response leaves about half of the change in
the distribution of wages and salaries unexplained. One possible explana-
tion for this unexplained residual is a switch from fringe benefits to wages
as the preferred form of compensation. Given that fringe benefits are
untaxed, a drop in the tax rate would indicate the greater likelthood for
such a substitution.
Empirical evidence for a very high responsiveness of fringe share to tax rates
is not present. However, evidence for modest responsiveness does exist. For
example, work by Turner (1988) suggests that taxation of fringes under the
pre-ERTA personal income tax would cause the fringe share of total compen-
sation to fall by one-third. Because the changes under ERTA were far less
dramatic than the full taxation of fringe benefits, a substantially smaller change
in the fringe share of compensation would be expected. Turner's work
suggests an elasticity of fringes with respect to federal tax rates of about 0.18.
Such an elasticity would imply that wage income was $30 billion, or 1.8
percent, higher as a result of the switch from fringes to taxable wages.
Combining this elasticity assumption for fringes with the labor supply
elasticities already reported produces a far better explanation of the change
in the distribution of wage and salary income. Figure 8 illustrates the share
of the variance between the 1979 and 1983 distributions explained by the
simulated response. As the figure indicates, over 90 percent of the
distributional change in the upper middle class is now explained. Between
50 and 80 percent of the change was explained for the bottom 80 percent of
the income distribution. (The result shown for the 8Oth-85th percentile is
low because 1979 and 1983 income shares for this group were quite similar.)
Furthermore, there is some evidence that this fringe benefit explanation
unemployment rate by an average of 1.2 percentage points. In the ten-year period preceding
1982, the female unemployment rate exceeded the male unemployment rate by an average of
1.3 percent. The earnings of full-time year-round female workers rose to an average 63 percent
of the earnings of full-time year-round male workers in the first year that ERTA was in effect,
after having been just 60 percent for each of the preceding eight years. The average of this ratio
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FIGURE 8. Labor supply and fringe response of wages (percent of
variance explained)
had some effect at the top of the income distribution. Roughly one-third of
the variance for the bottom half of the top percentile is explained by the
fringe benefit effect. The combined explanatory power of labor supply and
fringe benefit effects is about 10 percent for the very top earners, compared
to nil explanatory power for the labor supply effect by itself.The fringe
elasticity of 0.18 was derived from data on middle-income workers and
applied to all groups. Had a variable elasticity simulation been performed,
with a higher elasticity for upper-income taxpayers, a greater explanatory
power would most likely have resulted.
The revenue effect of the reduction in fringe benefits induced by ERTA's
rate reductions would amount to an additional $6 bfflion offederal income
taxes annually. It is important to consider whether this extra revenueis
permanent or simply an acceleration in the payment of taxes. In large
measure the answer depends on the type of fringecompensation given up.
Fringe benefits in the form of pension contributions produce future taxes
when the taxpayer receives the pension benefits. On the other hand, office
"perks" and insurance-type fringe benefits provide untaxed future bene-
fits. In this latter case, the extra taxes received are not at the expense of
future tax payments.
Turner's data show that pension benefits and insurance benefits make
up roughly equal shares of total fringes.His results suggest that pension
benefits are probably less sensitive to taxes than are insurance benefits,ERTA Raise Taxes of the Upper Income147
implying that less than half the reduction in fringes was due to a reduction
in pension benefits.
Furthermore, the amount of forgone taxes on future pension benefits is
likely to be far less than the taxes gained in the present by smaller pension
contributions. To avoid the issue of present value, we can assume that the
pension contributions grow in value at a rate equal to the rate of discount
of future tax liabifity. The only difference in tax revenues will be due to the
differential taxation of wage and pension income. In the aggregate, the
marginal tax rate on wage income is 22 percent under the new tax law but
only 19 percent on pension benefits. In fact, since pension contributions
accrue primarily to upper-income workers, this greatly understates the
extra taxes from wages. Furthermore, wages are subject to social insurance
contributions, but pensions are not. This would add an additional 14
percent to the total federal taxes received and raise the federal tax burden
on wages to 36 percent. In sum therefore, the extra revenue forgone from
lower future pension benefits is less than half the extra revenue received in
the present from lower pension contributions. Because less than half of the
switch from fringes to wages is in the form of pensions, it is safe to assume
that less than one-quarter of the revenue gained in the present from the
switch in form of compensation is at the expense of future revenue.
The extra revenue received from the switch from fringe benefits to wages
cannot be considered a supply side response because no additional factor
supplies are forthcoming. Instead, a pecuniary change has occurred in the
form of compensation that a worker receives.
Although no extra economic growth is attributable to the change, this
fringe benefit effect raises wages and salaries relative to what they other-
wise would have been. The level of wage and salary income in the baseline
income distribution described in section 1 was overstated. As a conse-
quence, the behavioral response to the tax rate reduction was understated.
To measure the true behavioral response to the tax changes, we must
add the labor supply and fringe benefit effects to the effects measured in
section 1.
The supply side and pecuniary changes in wage and salary compensa-
tion provide two possible explanations of the enormous behavioral re-
sponse of upper-income taxpayers relative to other taxpayers. If these
responses were neglected in forming the baseline income distribution, then
the actual response of middle- and upper-middle-income taxpayers is
much larger than previously estimated. This would make the total re-
sponses of upper-income and moderate-income taxpayers more compara-
ble. As Figure 7 showed, the labor supply and fringe benefit simulation had
relatively little explanatory power at the very top of the income distribu-148Lindsey
tion, but it was a signficant factor at other levels, thus indicating that the
ignored response was at these lower levels.
3.2.2Business Income.As in the case of wage and salary income, the
possibility of an omitted supply side response exists in the case of business
income. As the data presented in the first section indicated, business
incomeincome from proprietorships, partnerships, small business cor-
porations, farms, rents, and royaltiesrose far more rapidly than predicted
for upper-income taxpayers. Part of this response might be a supply side
response of these individuals working harder. However, applying labor
supply elasticities from the literature to the changes in after-tax compen-
sation due to ERTA produces a labor supply response that is far smaller
than the observed rise in business income. The likelihood of a supply side
response being the dominant factor in the change in business income is
therefore likely to be remote.
However, individuals who own their own businesses have a substantial
abffity to convert taxable business income into untaxed business expenses.
Work by Clotfelter, for example, indicates that the travel and entertainment
expenses of small finns is highly sensitive to the after-tax cost of the
compensation. These businesses also have a greater capacity to convert
current income into insurance and pension benefits than does the popula-
tion at large.
The test for tax effects on business income is performed in the same
manner as the tests on wage and salary income. Empirical estimates of the
effects of taxes on proprietorship and partnership decisons do not exist.
Therefore, an arbitrary selection of 0.56 was made. This value assumes that
business income is derived from primary earners with a labor supply
elasticity of 0.1 and a fringe elasticity of 0.18. It further assumes that small
businesses are twice as responsive as large firms to the tax effects on their
owners. Simulations done using this elasticity place it in region S2 of Figure
4, indicating an underprediction of the actual effect by the model.
Figure 9 shows that over half the variance between the pre-ERTA and
post-ERTA distributions is eliminated by the simulated response to the tax
rate changes. The results in Figure 9 show that the tax changes were
particularly effective in explaining the variance in the share of earnings
received by middle-income professionals and proprietary businesses.
However, in the case of income at the top of the business income
distribution, only about half of the variance was explained. This, coupled
with a similar result for top-bracket wages, suggests that additional factors
are at work.
As in the case of wages, some of the extra revenue resulting from the
response of taxpayers to the change in tax rates is transitory. As discussed
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FIGURE 9. Response of Business Income (percent of variance explained)
ally produce pension income that wifi be subject to tax. The more complex
types of deferred benefit packages are subject to the same analysis.
Furthermore, a case can be made that the tax bracket of these taxpayers is
less likely to drop when the benefits are received because they tend to be
near the top of the income distribution. This would suggest that a greater
degree of the revenue gain from extra business income is less likely to be
transitory for these taxpayers than it is for the population as a whole.
On the other hand, taxpayers receiving business income are more able to
change their compensation between taxable income and consumption-type
perks such as travel and entertainment. The transformation of perks into
taxable income may change the consumption mix of the individual, but this
change will not alter the amount of tax liabifities generated from other
sources or at a later date. This type of behavioral change will produce a
revenue gain that is more likely to be permanent and not offset by tax
effects.
3.2.3 Capital Gains.The evidence that capital gains reali7ations are
sensitive to tax rate changes has been demonstrated by many researchers
(Auten and Clotfelter (1983), Feldstein and Yitzhaki (1977), Lindsey
(198Th), Minarik (1981), and U. S. Depaxtiiient of the Treasury (1986)),
although the magnitude of the response is far from certain. In addition,
macroeconomic factors contributed to the level of capital gains realizations
as well as tax changes.
The baseline income distribution that underlies this study assumes that,150Lindsey
absent any tax changes, capital gains realizations rise at the same rate as
"tradable" household wealth. Tradable household wealth is composed of
corporate equities, real estate, and the value of unincorporatedbusinesses
as estimated in the Federal Reserve Board'sFlow of funds.
One can distinguish between the effects of macroeconomic factors, such
as the rise in household wealth, andthe effect of tax changes. An overall
rise in wealth would be likely to cause an increase in the level of capital
gains, but not a redistribution of the share of capital gains received by
different taxpayers. On the other hand, a tax rate reduction is likely to
cause both a rise in the overall level of realizationsand a change in the
distribution of those realizations, reflecting the different changes in incen-
tives for different taxpayers under ERTA. If the change in the distribution
of capital gains resembles the distributional change predicted by behavioral
simulations of the response of capital gains realizations to tax changes, then
the tax changes are the likely cause of the rise in capital gains.
The test of the hypothesis that tax-induced changes were at work
resembles the tests performed to check for tax effects in the distribution of
wages. The 1983 level and distribution of capital gainsrealizations was
adjusted to take account of the changes in marginal tax rates between 1979
and 1983. An elasticity of capital gains realizations with respect to an
after-tax share of 5.2 was selected to simulate the tax effect using the result
from Lindsey (198Th). This elasticity is equivalent to an elasticity of 0.8 with
respect to the tax rate.
The simulation placed the distribution line in region S2 of Figure 6,
indicating that the assumption underpredicted the actual change. How-
ever, the simulated distribution was quite close tothe pre-ERTA distribu-
tion, indicating a high degree of explanatory power by the simulation.
Figure 10 shows the amount of variance between the 1979 and 1983
distributions, which was explained by the tax effect. On average, the
simulation explained over 80 percent of the variance between the 1979 and
the 1983 distributions.
It should be stressed that any behavioral response to changes in capital
gains tax rates is not supply side in the usual meaning of the term. The
observed response of extra realizations is not evidence that existing
supplies of capital are brought forth as a result of the tax change. It might
be argued that the existing stock of capital is more likely to be efficiently
allocated with the lower capital gains tax rate, since taxpayers are less likely
to be locked in to their existing portfolios because of tax considerations.It
might also be argued that lowering the total tax rate on capital income will
increase the rate of savings on the margin above what it otherwise would
have been. However, the benefits of such changes are only likely to evolveERTA Raise Taxes of the Upper Income151
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over a long time and are probably too small to be observed in the existing
data.
The revenue gain from such a change in capital gains reali7ations might
best be termed pecuniary rather than supply-side because the behavioral
response represents a rearrangement of the existing supply of capital rather
than an increase in the overall quantity. This rearrangement of portfolios
raises the further question of whether this revenue gain is permanentor
temporary.
3.3 The Surprising Case of Ordinary Investment Income
The period between 1979 and 1983 was one of rapidly rising interest and
dividend income for taxpayers as a whole. Interest and dividend income
rose by $97 billion between 1979 and 1983, or by 90 percent. This was nearly
three times as fast as the growth in AGI over the same period. Further-
more, interest and dividend income is highly concentrated among upper-
income brackets. For example, the top 1 percent of interest and dividend
recipients receive about a quarter of total income from thesesources.
The combined effect of the sharp rise in interest and dividends and the
concentration of that income among high-income taxpayers would bea
large redistribution of total personal income toward top-bracket taxpayers.
Further enhancing this expectation are indications that the share of wealth
in the country, which produces interest and dividend income, held by the
top of the income distribution may have increased. In addition, the tax rate














least as dramatic in the case of interest and dividend income as it was inthe
case of wage and professional income. Allof these factors would lead to the
expectation that the increased share of income received by upper-income
taxpayers between 1979 and 1983 would be due in part to theoverall rise in
capital income.
This turns out not to be the case. Greater interest and dividend income
was not a factor in the increase in the shareof total income received by the
top 1 percent of the income distribution. The total incomeof this group was
nearly $23 billion higher than it would have been had its share of income
remained unchanged. Of this figure, $22 billion can be explained by the
rising share of capital gains income and a further $8 billion bythe rising
share of earned income. The net change in the share of interestand
dividend income was a negative component in contributing to the higher
share of total income received by the top 1 percent. This result is one of the
most unexpected findings in the tax data.
The reason for this is a sharp reduction in the share of interestand
dividend income received by the top recipients of this income. Unlike the
other types of income considered, the share of income from interestand
dividends received by upper-income taxpayers was lower in 1983 than in
1979. The top 1 percent of recipients of this type of incomereceived 27.1
percent of interest and dividend income in 1979 and 23.2 percent in1983.
This decline in the share of interest and dividend income received atthe
very top did not move to the bottomof the distribution, however, but
stayed in the top half of the income distribution. The lower half of interest
and dividend recipients received the same share of interest anddividend
income in the two years: 2.2 percent. On the other hand, taxpayers inthe
50th to 90th percentiles of interest and dividend income recipients sawtheir
share rise from 30 to 33 percent. Taxpayers in these percentileclasses
typically received between $300 and $5000 in interest and dividends in 1979
and between $600 and $9000 in interest and dividends in 1983.
Tax law changes are unlikely to account for this change. If savingis
positively related to the after-tax share of portfolio income kept by the
taxpayer, then a redistribution of this income to top-brackettaxpayers
would be indicated. The pattern of response would be similar to that seen
in the cases of wages, capital gains, and business income.
In this case, an institutional factor can be identified to explain thisdata.
Money market mutual funds became widely available between 1979and
1983. Furthermore, the deregulation of the banking system afforded savers
with moderate-sized portfolios saving instruments that yieldedmarket
interest rates previously available only to the very wealthy. Taxpayerswith
small portfolios probably had fewer increases in the optionsavailable to
them than did taxpayers with portfolios of $10,000 or more. Thus,the shareERTA Raise Taxes of the Upper Income153
change did not extend down to the bottom half of the distributionof
income and dividend recipients.
The revenue consequences of this institutional changeare likely to be
negative. The opening of these money market accounts either raised the
total cost of borrowing above what it otherwise would have beenor
reduced the spreads of financial intermediaries. It probably hadthe added
effect of lowering the return to lenders other than those whoavailed
themselves of these new financial instruments. The taxstatus of these
groups can be compared. The taxpayers with the new money market
accounts were in an above average personal tax bracket, say 30 percent, but
well below the top rate. On the other hand, final borrowers and financial
intermediaries are taxed at the marginal corporate rate of 46percent.
Lenders who previously had access to market rateswere probably also at or
near the top marginal personal rate of 50 percent. Thus, the beneficiaries of
these accounts had lower marginal tax rates than those whose incomemay
have declined due to the new accounts.
4. TAXPAYER BEHAVIOR AND THE 1986 TAX REFORM
The previous section described a number of possible behavioralphenom-
ena that followed the tax rate reductions of the 1981 Tax Act. TRA86
continued the rate-cutting tradition of the earlier act. The maximumtax rate
on ordinary income was reduced from 50 to 33 percent, witha further
reduction to 28 percent for very-high-income taxpayers. Unlike the1981
Act, TRA86 aggressively expanded the income tax base. Theexpansion of
the base offset in large measure the potentialrevenue loss from the
reduction in tax rates.
This section examines the potential effects of the base broadeningand
rate reduction in the 1986 Act. The possible supply side ramifications ofrate
reductions are considered as well as therevenue effects of pecuniary
changes in taxpayer behavior. The revenue estimates presented hereare
intended to convey only the potential magnitude of supply sideassump-
tions; they do not represent a forecast of what is likely to happen.
As in the case of the analysis presented earlier, the majorpotential
behavioral response involves top-bracket taxpayers. Thesetaxpayers will
have the largest reduction in their tax rates and the greatest increasein the
after-tax share of income. The earlier analysis also indicated that the degree
of responsiveness to tax rate changes may also be greater forupper-income
taxpayers than for the taxpaying population as a whole. For all of these
reasons, the magnitude of revenue response at the top of the income
distribution is the key to whether or not TRA86 isrevenue neutral as
claimed, raises taxes, or reduces taxes. The magnitude of the behavioral154Lindsey
response will also determinewhether the share of taxes paid by upper-
income taxpayers will rise, as it did after the1981 Tax Act, or fall.
4.1 Revenue Estimates With No TaxpayerBehavior
The first step in simulating the effect of the 1986Act is the creation of a
baseline income distribution for a year in which the newlaw wifi be in
effect; 1988 was selected. The baseline for a future yearinvolves a proce-
dure not required for simulating a past event: forecastingfuture macroec-
onomic levels. The use of any economic forecastnecessarily creates added
uncertainty regarding the accuracy of the revenue estimates,because actual
economic conditions may differ from those forecast. Forthese simulations,
the economic forecast contained in the 1988 budgetof the United States was
used.
The 1988 baseline income distribution was extrapolatedfrom the 1983
Individual Tax Model File Public Use Sample usingthe NBER TAXSIM
model. The resulting distribution presumes that taxpayersbehave as they
behaved in 1983, the year from which the original data areobtained. Each
taxpayer is allotted a higher income level, reflectingeconomic growth over
the period, and a different composition of income,reflecting the forecast
change in economic conditions between 1983and 1988. Any possible
behavioral response by the taxpayers to the new tax ratesimplied by the
change in income and the new tax law areignored in the first set of
simulations.
Table 1 presents the results of these simulations. Taxpayers areclassified
by income class based on the definition of adjusted grossincome in a fully
phased-in version of TRA86. The total tax paid by taxpayersin that income
group is reported for three different taxlaws: the old or prereform tax law,
the TRA86 tax law for the year 1988, and a fully phased-inversion of TRA86.
The latter two laws differ in that some of the newbase-broadening
provisions of the TRA are only partially implementedin 1988.
The table shows that absent any behavioral response,the new tax law
will raise taxes on all income groups earning over$50,000, and lower taxes
on all income groups earning lessthan $50,000. Given the 1988 tax rules,
this will mean that total taxes wifi be about $2.6 billionhigher under the
new tax bifi than under the old taxbifi. Taxpayers earning over $200,000
will pay $4.6 billion more, and taxpayers earningbetween $100,000 and
$200,000 will pay $3.1 billion more. Each figure represents an8 percent
increase in taxes. In contrast, taxes for taxpayersearning under $10,000 wifi
be cut nearly in half, and those for taxpayers earningbetween $10,000 and
$20,000 will dedine by about 10 percent. In total, the shareof taxes paid by
taxpayers earning over $50,000 will rise from54.0 percent under the old law
to 56.7 percent under the new law.All numbers are for calendar 1988.
Income classes are in thousands.
Revenue figures are in billions.
The table also shows that the phase-out provisions of thenew tax law
involved $10.9 biffion of revenue in 1988. Although allgroups would see
their taxes rise if the phase-out provisionswere eliminated, most of the
extra revenue would come from upper-income taxpayers. Nearlyone-
quarter of the revenue consequences of the phase-out provisions involve
taxpayers with incomes over $200,000, whereas more than 70 percent of the
phase-out revenue involves taxpayers with incomesover $50,000. There-
fore, as the tax provisions are phased out, the share oftax payments by
upper-income taxpayers will continue to rise. If these provisionswere fully
subject to tax in 1988, 57.1 percent of taxes would be paid bytaxpayers
earning more than $50,000.
These results indicate that absent any behavioralresponse by taxpayers,
the new individual income tax provisions will increase personalincome tax
revenue. Furthermore, they show that the 1986 Act increased the share of
taxes paid by upper-income taxpayers, even though the tax rateon these
taxpayers dropped dramatically. This is evidence that the base broadening
more than compensated for the lower tax rate.
4.2 The Potential Taxpayer Response
Previously, we identified a number of possible supply side andpecuniary
responses that taxpayers might undertake. On the supply side, increased
real wage income would result from increased labor supply. Thesame
would occur in the case of professional income. In addition,pecuniary
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TABLE 1
Tax Revenue Assuming No BehavioralResponse
Income





Under 10 3.2 1.7 1.8 10-20 28.2 25.5 25.9 20-30 44.4 43.3 44.0 30-40 51.7 50.0 50.8 40-50 47.8 46.2 47.3 50-75 78.8 80.9 82.9 75-100 32.1 34.2 35.3
100-200 38.8 42.3 44.3 Over 200 61.7 68.4 71.3 Total 386.6 392.5 403.7156Lindsey
reallocations of compensation into taxable wagesalong with out-of-tax-
exempt compensation would be likely toresult from the tax rate reduction.
On the other hand, the 1986 Act producedthe largest increase in capital
gains tax rates on record. This would causefewer capital gains to be
realized and cause tax revenue to decline relative tothe no-behavior
revenue figures.
These potential responses were simulatedseparately for each of the
types of income involved: wages,professional income, and capital gains.
The elasticities used were the same as thoseused in the previous section.
For wages, a labor supply elasticity with respect toafter-tax share of 0.1 was
used for single individuals and for the higher earner inmarried couples. An
elasticity of 1.0 with respect to after-tax share wasused for the wages of the
lower-earning spouse if both spouses worked.Turner's fdnge benefit
elasticity of 0.18 was added to each of thesefigures. For professional and
proprietary income, an elasticity of 0.56 with respect tothe after-tax share
was used. Finally, a capitalgains elasticity of 4.5 with respect to the after-
tax share was used in the simulationof taxpayer response to the increase in
the capital gains tax rate. A final simulation wasalso run, which incorpo-
rated the effects of all of these responses. The totaleffect might differ from
the sum of the individual effects due to theinteraction of different types of
income in determining a taxpayer's taxable incomeand tax rate.
As stated previously, these elasticities should notbe considered precise
estimates or predictions. They were selected inorder to estimate an order
of magnitude for any potential taxpayer response.As such, these estimates
tend to err on the high side. Readers who feel that thebehavioral parameter
is twice as high as it should be will findthat a revenue effect half as large
as estimated is in linewith their prior expectations.
It is also important to note that thesesimulations presume that any
supply side response would be reflected in a higherlevel of nominal
income. In fact, this is unlikely to be the case.Given a constant monetary
policy, a rise in labor supply wifi increase nominalincome by less than it
will increase real income. These simulations thereforeoverstate the rise in
nominal tax revenue that would result from thesimulated supply side
response. They represent the change in revenuethat would be expected at
a given level of pricesand rate of inflation.
Table 2 presents the revenue results from each of thesimulations of these
behavioral responses. In each case, the behavioralsimulation was per-
formed at 1988 income levels, assuming thatTRA86 was fully phased in.
The revenue effect is given for each incomeclass based on the new law's
fully phased-in definition of adjusted gross income.
The table shows that the simulated behavioral responseof wages would
produce an additional $13.8 billion of revenue, orabout 3.5 percent moreAll figures for 1988.
Income classes are in thousands.
Revenue effects are in billions.
than expected. Of this additional revenue, 53 percent would be derived
from taxpayers with incomes over $100,000 and 91 percent from taxpayers
earning more than $50,000. This extra tax revenue results from a $57 billion,
or 2.4 percent, rise in total wage and salary income. A 17 percent rise in
wage income for taxpayers earning more than $200,000 is indicated. More
than one-quarter of the total rise in wage and salary income willaccrue to
taxpayers in this income class, and nearly three-quarters will accrue to
taxpayers earning more than $50,000. The share of wages and salaries
received by taxpayers earning more than $50,000 wifi rise from 35.3 to 36.2
percent. These changes in the distribution of wage and salary income are of
roughly the same order of magnitude as the changes that followed the 1981
Tax Act.
Table 2 indicates that professional and proprietary income would rise
enough to generate $1.6 billion in extra revenue in 1988, given the
simulation parameters described above. This extra revenue would result
from a $6 billion increase in business and professional income, a 6 percent
increase.
In sum, the simulated potential increase in revenue from greater labor
supply and lower fringe benefits amounts to $15.5 billion. To individuals
not familiar with the magnitudes involved in the federal budget, this may
seem like a large number. However, it amounts to slightly less than 4
percent of personal income tax revenue and roughly 1.5 percent of total
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TABLE 2
Potential Revenue Impact of Behavioral Responses
Income
class







Under 10 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 -0.2
10-20 -1.4 -0.0 -0.2 -1.6
20-30 +0.1 +0.0 -0.5 -0.4
30-40 +2.0 +0.1 -0.6 +1.5
40-50 +0.8 +0.1 -0.8 +0.1
50-75 +2.7 +0.2 -2.7 +0.2
75-100 +2.6 +0.2 -2.3 +0.5
100-200 +3.0 +0.5 -5.3 -1.8
Over 200 +4.4 +0.5 -18.4 -13.5
Total +13.8 +1.6 -30.8 -15.5158Lindsey
federal revenue. It represents the extra revenue produced from a typical
year's economic growth of 2.5 to 3.0 percent. In short, potential supply side
responses should not be relied on to balance the federal budget or to be
sufficient to finance further marginal tax rate reductions.
In addition, although the wage, salary, and professional income re-
sponses wifi produce more tax revenue than predicted by the behavior-free
model, the reverse is true for capital gains behavior. The 1986 Act
mandated the largest increase in capital gains tax rates on record. Absent a
behavioral response, this tax rate increase would boost tax revenues by
roughly $15 billion in 1988. This $15 billion increase is factored into the
revenue estimates presented in Table 1. There is general agreement that at
least some reduction in capital gains realizations wifi result from this tax
rate increase, however (Turner (1988)). Thus, the behavior-free revenue
estimates in Table 1 exaggerate the amount of tax revenue that will be
collected.
To estimate the magnitude of the possible revenue effect, an elasticity of
4.5 with respect to the after-tax share was used. The third column in Table
2 presents the revenue consequences of such an assumption. Total revenue
declines $30.8 billion due to the reduced realization of capital gains. This
represents 7.7 percent of total personal income tax revenue and twice the
simulated response of wage, salary, and professional income.
The table also shows that the great majority of this revenue decline
would occur among upper-income taxpayers. Fully 60 percent of the
decline would occur among taxpayers earning over $200,000, and 93
percent of the revenue decline would occur among taxpayers making over
$50,000. This would have a dramatic effect on the share of taxes paid by
different income groups. Taxpayers earning more than $100,000 would see
the share of taxes they pay drop from 29 percent under the behavior-free
simulation to 25 percent. The share of taxes paid by taxpayers earning
under $40,000 would rise from 30 to 33 percent. In short, the potential
behavioral response to the capital gains tax changes would have important
distributional consequences as well as a substantial effect on total govern-
ment tax collections.
The final colunm presents the combined effect of the three behavioral
responses. The data presented here show that the tendencyof TRA86 to
increase the share of taxes paid by upper-income taxpayers in the behavior-
free model is reversed when potential taxpayer behavior is taken into
account. Taxpayers earning more than $200,000 pay 16 percent of total
taxes under the old tax law. This rises to nearly 18 percent under the
no-behavior simulation of a fully phased-in TRA86. However, the tax share
for this group of taxpayers falls to 15 percent when all behaviors are
simulated together.ERTA Raise Taxes of the Upper Income159
In sum, potential taxpayer behavior in response to the changes in the tax
law may completely reverse the tendency of TRA86 to increase the tax
share at the top. This is exactly opposite to what happened after the tax rate
reductions of ERTA. In that case, the behavior-free tax rate effects indicated
a reduction in the share of taxes paid by upper-income taxpayers. When
the actual results were reported, the reverse occurred, and the tax share
paid by upper-income taxpayers rose. Absent thebehavioral response to
the capital gains tax rate increase, TRA86 would extend the trend of greater
tax shares at the top. However, the potential response to the capital gains
tax increase is so great that the 1980s may end with the tax share paid by
upper-income taxpayers back at the level at which it began the decade.
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